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ABSTRACT Wireless sensor networks (WSNs), as an essential part of the deployment of the Internet
of Things paradigm, require an adequate debugging and monitoring procedures to avoid errors in their
operation. One of the best tools for WSN supervision is the so-called Monitoring Platforms that harvest
information about the WSN operation in order to detect errors and evaluate performance. Monitoring
platforms for the WSN can be hardware or software implemented, and, additionally, they can work in
active or passive mode. Each approach has advantages and drawbacks. To benefit from their advantages
and compensate their limitations, hybrid platforms combine different approaches. However, very few hybrid
tools, with many restrictions, have been proposed. Most of them are designed for a specific implementation
of WSN nodes; many of them are lack of a real implementation, and none of them provides an accurate
solution to synchronization issues. This paper presents a hybrid monitoring platform for WSN, called
HMP. This platform combines both hardware and software, active and passive monitoring approaches. This
hybridization provides many interesting capabilities; HMP harvests the information both actively (directly
from the sensor nodes) and passively (by means of messages captured from the WSN), causing a very low
intrusion in the observed network. In addition, HMP is reusable; it may be applied to almost any WSN
and includes a suitable trace synchronism procedure. Finally, HMP follows an open architecture that allows
interoperability and layered development.
INDEX TERMS Hybrid monitoring, monitoring, synchronization, distributed monitoring platform, WSN.
I. INTRODUCTION
The new advances in the development of the Internet of
Things (IoT) make us focus on this approach as one of the
technologies that will shape our future. The IoT paradigm
includes many successful technologies, whose deployment
has also been accelerated [1], [2]. Among them, WSN are
one of the most widespread and studied [3]. However, despite
of the high degree of development that has been achieved,
every WSN implementation may suffer design, implementa-
tion and operation errors and failures. Many issues may cause
these errors, such as programming errors, failures in wire-
less communications, malfunction of nodes, environmental
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
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effects, among others. Therefore, the operation of aWSN can
be affected and failures [4], [5] or security attacks [6] may
happen. There are several ways to evaluate and diagnose the
functioning of aWSN. Thesemethodsmay be used during the
development, deployment or operation of the network. For
example, simulators or emulators [7] are generally used in
development phase to test new functionalities, although they
have several limitations.
Monitoring equipment, evaluation systems or platforms
for WSN –sometimes referred as WSN Monitors– facilitate
the verification of the correct operation of a WSN and the
location of possible errors. These platforms are usually very
specific. Some of them are oriented to provide information
in real time, which requires many resources and usually gen-
erates a non-negligible intrusion in the monitored network.
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Other proposals are based in the generation of a trace of
events for further analysis [8].
The monitoring platforms can be classified as active or
passive. Active monitoring platforms interact directly with
the elements of WSN and require the nodes to provide its
internal state, and thus obtaining high precision data. How-
ever, they use resources from the observed WSN, slowing
its activity and draining its electrical power. These phenom-
ena are usually called interference or intrusion, and they
affect the operation of the analyzed networks and, there-
fore, reduce their performance. On the other hand, passive
monitoring platforms do not modify neither the operation
nor the performance of the WSN, because they are based
on spying the communications between the elements of the
WSN and/or processing the information that reaches the sink.
Nevertheless, the information provided by passive tools may
be insufficient for a complete analysis.
The denomination ‘‘ hybrid monitoring‘‘ has tradition-
ally been used when referred to a combination of hard-
ware and software [9]. However, the term hybrid may also
be used for other monitoring systems that combine two
different approaches, such as wired-wireless, local-global,
fixed-mobile, or active-passive. The proposals presented
in [10] – which combines monitoring approaches by
events and time to detect vulnerabilities in software – or
in [11] – a system of active-passive monitoring for WSN–
are also presented as examples of hybrid monitoring.
According to the analysis made in [12], new hybrid mon-
itoring systems may combine the advantages of different
approaches to compensate for their disadvantages. However,
after studying a large number of monitoring proposals, very
few of them use hybrid monitoring, and those are very
limited.
This paper presents a Hybrid Monitoring Platform (HMP)
for WSN that combines both hardware/ software and active/
passive approaches. One of its main features is the low
intrusion or interference obtained thanks to the hybrid
approach. This way, software elements on the observed nodes
actively provide detailed information about their behavior.
In order to discharge the observed node from data process-
ing, storage, time stamping, and transmission procedures
as non-hybrid active proposals do, in our hybrid approach
additional hardware elements receive these data as events and
perform those functions. In addition, other sniffer devices
perform passive monitoring of the communications in the
observed WSN, providing a new sequence of events. Both
sequences of events are recorded in log files, along with time
tags, as traces. These traces must be synchronized in order
to correctly correlate the events of different nodes, as some
of them may have a causal relation. This way, HMP inte-
grates a new trace synchronization mechanism called GTSO
(Global Trace Synchronization and Ordering Mechanism).
HMP includes three different hardware devices: Monitor
Node, Sniffer Node, and Monitor Server. A Synchronization
Server is also required to support GTSO, although it can be
integrated in the Monitor Server.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows:
In section 2 an analysis of the state of the art on WSN
monitoring is presented. Section 3 details the proposal of
the HMP. Section 4 shows the results of the evaluation of
the hybrid platform and section 5 compares it with others
proposals. Finally, section 6 briefs the conclusions of this
proposal.
II. RELATED WORK ABOUT WSN MONITORING
There are several platforms and tools for monitoring or
debugging the performance of a WSN. Most of them use an
active or a passive approach, but a very few can be consid-
ered to adjust into a hybrid approach. This section outlines
the most representative monitoring tools proposed in recent
years. Additionally, as synchronization is a main issue to
guarantee a correct ordering of the events captured in different
monitor nodes, a detailed study about synchronization in
distributed monitoring platforms is presented.
A. ACTIVE AND PASSIVE MONITORS
SNMS (Sensor Network Management System) [13] is one of
the first and best knownmonitoring systems forWSN. SNMS
is basically a very complete network management system
based on TinyOS [14] that provides a set of services: health
data collection and network status based on queries, and per-
sistent event logging. It is also foundwith the nameNucleos in
some references. Due to its capabilities and operating modes,
it causes a high intrusion in the nodes [13]. Additionally, it is
only suitable for sensor nodes based on TinyOS.
Memento [15] and Lightweight Tracing [16] are examples
of active monitors that use simple encoding to record events
and related information. The first one adds a piece of data
that contains node information in the message to transmit.
This way, it is able to detect problems in a node based on
the information provided by a group of nodes in the network.
Although the intrusion in RAM space is less than SNMS and
depends on whether this code can be transmitted, intrusion in
code space is high, as well as the time intrusion. The second
one (Lightweight) registers events and states in a non-volatile
memory, using a very light coding. Afterwards, it carries out a
reconstruction and debugging of the behavior of the network.
Its intrusion in memory is similar to the previous one and no
data about time intrusion is provided. Moreover, a drawback
of both tools is that they do not record the time when events
are registered.
EnviroLog [17], NodeMD [18], PDA (Passive Distributed
Assertions for Sensor Networks) [19] and TARDIS (Trace
And Replay Debugging In Sensornets) [20] are proposals
based on adding and activating a monitoring code in the
sensor nodes. Both EnviroLog and TARDIS record events and
save them in a flash memory for later reproduction, although
the authors of TARDIS claim to be able to register more
types of events than the other proposals. Both tools need a
large memory space (up to a 25% of increase). Like many
other tools, the authors provide no data about time intru-
sion. NodeMD creates a trace with the events that produce
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a failure in a node for later analysis. Memory requirements
are less than previous proposal, but NodeMD generates a
time intrusion of near 80 CPU cycles per event registration.
PDA emits information about the state of the node based on
assertions added to the node code. As in the previous cases,
it is not possible to know when the events occur in any of
these four monitors. No data of intrusion is provided, only the
network overload (as they use the same network to transmit
the monitored information) is reported (8%).
Deployment Support Network (DSN) [21] is a platform
composed of nodes connected to the WSN’s nodes by a
serial interface. These attached nodes allow testing, con-
trolling and monitoring applications in real environments.
The DSN nodes are connected to each other via Bluetooth.
MARWIS [22] is similar to DSN, but it can be applied
to heterogeneous networks, using a parallel wireless mesh
network to divide the WSN into subnets, according to their
characteristics. However, in addition to the intrusion caused
by the capabilities of these platforms, the use of Bluetooth for
connecting monitoring nodes may cause interferences in the
observed WSN, and also suffers from other problems related
with this technology. Unfortunately, no intrusion metrics are
provided for these tools.
SNIF (Sensor Network Inspection Framework) [21], [22],
Pimoto [25], LiveNet [26], SNDS (Sensor Network Dis-
tributed Sniffer) [27], NSSN (Networkmonitoring and packet
Sniffing tool for wireless Sensor Networks) [28], EPMOSt
(Energy-efficient PassiveMonitoring SysTem forWSN) [29],
and Z-Monitor [30] are examples of passive monitoring
platforms with similar schema. They propose a network of
sniffers deployed next to the WSN that captures the trans-
missions of the nodes. The difference between them is how
the captured data is processed. Some of them transmit the
data through a TCP/IP (Transport Control Protocol / Internet
Protocol) network to another device for processing. In other
cases, the sniffer can function as a sink, collecting and ana-
lyzing the information. They can also provide a real-time
analysis of the operation data of the sensor network. How-
ever, these tools cannot obtain information directly from the
nodes.
Sympathy [31] and PAD (Passive Diagnosis forWSN) [32]
are presented as passive monitoring systems. However, due to
their operation, they could be considered as active monitors.
Both are based on the aggregation of light information to
the messages transmitted by the node, for later deduction
of behavior or failures detection. As before, these proposals
overload the application messages of the observed nodes.
Minerva [33], FlockLab [34] and TWECIS [35] are exam-
ples of Testbeds for WSN. A Testbed does not only monitor
the operation of the nodes of a WSN, but it also allows
the modification of the configuration in the nodes, and even
request them information about their state. However, they are
usually limited to laboratory environments and thus are not
suitable for a deployed WSN.
Spi-Snooper is a monitoring platform for WSN that
integrates hardware and software in a hybrid approach.
According to its operation mode it can work actively
and passively [36]. In brief, Spi-Snooper is amonitor attached
to the sensor node that ‘‘spies’’ the SPI (Serial-Peripheral
Interface) bus between the mainmicrocontroller and the radio
peripheral controller. However, its application is not possible
in nodes based on later microcontrollers with a built-in radio
peripheral.
HDF (Hybrid Debugging Framework for Distributed Net-
work Environments) [11] combines both active–the execution
of orders and queries about the state of a monitored node– and
passive approach –the listening of information by a device
linked to the WSN node–, to carry out the debugging of a
WSN in real time. However, the authors have not published
information about the overload caused in a real WSN, and its
operation has been tested only theoretically. From now, just
one of its components – the active one– has been developed
as a prototype..
As it is clear from the previous paragraphs, passive plat-
forms that only receive messages from the network cannot be
aware of what happens internally in the node, whereas active
tools can access to the internal node events but produce a
non-negligible intrusion in the observed WSN.
Unfortunately, most of active monitoring proposals do not
consider the impact of monitoring operation on the observed
WSN. The intrusion is admitted as a penalty to be paid
to gather all the necessary information, at the expense of
perturbing the functioning of the system under test. On the
other hand, the very few implemented previously described
approaches use different hardware. Finally, the intrusion has
proven to be hardly dependent of the monitoring campaign,
for instance, related to the number of events to register. For
all these reasons, it is very difficult to perform a quantitative
comparison analysis between these proposals.
Another main issue to consider is that some of the cited
monitoring proposals –both active and passive– do not record
the time in which the events occur. Finally, most of moni-
toring platforms are designed to monitor a specific type of
sensor node, so they cannot to be used in WSN that use other
hardware.
The main advantage of a hybrid approach is to minimize
this intrusion and affect as little as possible the behavior of
the system under observation.
So, according to the analysis made in [12], new hybrid
monitoring systems could combine the advantages of differ-
ent approaches to compensate for their disadvantages. How-
ever, after studying a large number of monitoring proposals,
very few of them use hybrid monitoring, and those are very
limited.
B. SYNCHRONIZATION IN WSN
DISTRIBUTED MONITORING
Synchronization is one of the most important issues in any
distributed system, such as distributed monitoring platforms.
The different elements in the platform must coordinate their
operation to provide a correct temporal view of the monitored
system.
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Usually, distributed monitoring platforms for WSN use
online mechanisms for synchronization. These online syn-
chronization methods adjust the internal clock of the compo-
nents during the monitoring process. Online synchronization
uses several strategies, usually based in messages exchange
and calculations on timestamps, for estimating and removing
of clock’s skew and offset [37], [38]. In a common online
mechanism, such as NTP [39], a node could receive one or
moremessages with information about reference clock and/or
local offset, and it can use this information for adjusting its
internal clock. This NTP-based approach will be used later to
compare our proposal. On the other hand, offline synchroniza-
tion techniques correct the time stamps of the data collected
by the platform after performing the monitoring.
SNIF [24] and PDA [19] use a Bluetooth specific syn-
chronization protocol. Many monitor nodes with TCP/IP
capability —as Pimoto PC Gateway, sniffers of NSSN [28],
components of Minerva [33] or FlockLab [34]— use the
Network Time Protocol (NTP) for synchronizing. To achieve
higher precision, SNDS [27] uses PTP (Precision Time Syn-
chronization Protocol ) and TWECIS uses [35] RTE (Real
Time Ethernet); however, both mechanism require additional
or special hardware.
Online mechanisms could introduce errors in the correct
order of events because they can adjust local clocks back-
wards. This is due to the different variability of the clock
rate, as shown in [40]. Most of the online mechanisms used
in WSN monitoring offer accuracies of the order of millisec-
onds. This may be not suitable to record events in WSN
nodes, which can happen within differences of microseconds.
Besides, the more precision mechanisms, such PTP or RTE,
require additional hardware and cause more overload on
monitors [41], [42].
On the other hand, only LiveNet [26] and Pimoto [25]
apply offline methods to provide trace synchronization. How-
ever, thesemethods do not consider the variability of the clock
rate in different nodes. Therefore, errors in the synchroniza-
tion could occur.
A synchronization mechanism is required to perform an
adequate synchronization formonitoring operation. This way,
it is possible to overcome the disadvantages of the aforemen-
tioned mechanisms. This proposal must not require specific
hardware to be suitable for any monitoring platform, and it
must offer a precision according to the observed system.
III. HYBRID MONITORING PLATFORM PROPOSAL
This section details the structure and operation of the Hybrid
Monitoring Platform for WSN. First, HMP architecture,
the global operation of the platform, the basic functionality
of each component and the synchronization mechanism are
described. Afterwards, the implementation of each compo-
nent is individually detailed.
A. PLATFORM ARCHITECTURE
The architecture of HMP is based on a reference model
proposed in [43], and presented in Figure 1. Using a
FIGURE 1. Reference model for the monitoring platform [43].
reference model aids in the design of monitoring platforms
and systematizes the comparative analysis of present and
future proposals. Three layers may be identified at this model:
Monitoring Layer, Information layer, and Interchange Layer.
The Monitoring layer, which is located at the top of the
model, deals with the abstraction of the particularities of the
observed network, such as the data to acquire, the definition
of the capture mechanism and how data will be shown to
the user. This abstraction allows that different WSN may be
observed with a common systematic approach, and most of
the platform hardware may be reused for different monitor-
ing campaigns on different WSN, even they are based on
diverse technologies. More on, heterogeneous WSN – where
nodes of different technologies collaborate –may be observed
in a coordinated way, overcoming the hardware differences
among nodes.
The Information layer –located below the Monitoring
layer–performs the encoding of the acquired information in a
standardized format, and it provides the time-related services,
such as capture triggering and timestamps. The Interchange
layer –in the lower part of the model– is in charge of the
services related to the storage and/or transmission of the
information captured in the different modules of the platform.
These services allow retrieving this information for analysis
and/or visualization in the Monitoring layer.
For each layer, the architecture defines interfaces to com-
municate with its adjacent layers. A layered architecture
allows changes in one of the layers without affecting the
others. This way, any improvement in a platform module
should be easier to develop and implement. In addition, this
model allows interoperability between components of differ-
ent monitoring platforms.
HMP consists of three basic components: The Monitor
Node (MN), the Sniffer Node (SN), and the Monitor Server
(MS). Figure 2 shows the components of the HMP and its
location in relation to a monitored WSN.
Each MN records the events of interest reported from its
sensor node, adds a timestamp, and stores this information
with a structured format in the trace. Later, after the end
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FIGURE 2. Structure and components of HMP. Components of the WSN
are included.
of the monitoring campaign, the MN sends the trace to
the MS.
Each SN covers a specific area of the WSN, being able to
capture the messages transmitted by the sensor nodes in this
area. In this sense, its function does not differ from the sniffers
that use other proposals, although the SN is integrated with
the rest of the HMP according with the predefined architec-
ture. TheMonitor Server collects the information obtained by
the different platform elements for processing. In addition,
the MS could be in charge of other functions, such as the
synchronization of the obtained data as described below.
FIGURE 3. Scheme of the operation of HMP.
As told, HMP combines both active and passivemonitoring
mechanisms. Figure 3 illustrates the platform components
that work in each of these modes, its basic operations and
the data flow between them. The active component of the
platform is mainly located in the sensor nodes of the observed
WSN and their attached Monitor Node. Each MN connects
with a very small piece of software added to each monitored
sensor node, called software ‘‘ traps’’. This code will be
executed when an event of interest is detected. It transmits its
associated code plus additional data (if required) to the MN,
through one of the standard interfaces available in the WSN
node. The MN receives and adds a timestamp to the received
data; it formats them in a structured way and finally stores or
transmits all the gathered information to the Monitor Server
for processing.
The Sniffer Nodes are the passive components of the plat-
form. Each SN captures the application messages on the air
and saves them with a predefined format, which includes a
timestamp. The captured messages will be transmitted later
to the Monitor Server, like the MN messages.
The traces obtained in both passive and active monitors
(SN andMN)must be processed by theMonitor Server (MS).
Traces are merged in a single log file that reflects the relevant
events in all the observed elements of the WSN, and thus
its behavior. This information is stored for later processing,
and may be displayed and analyzed in the MS, or be used as
synthetic load for simulation campaigns.
Finally, it is interesting to highlight the possibility of using
HMP in any distributed system, regardless of its specific char-
acteristics (hardware, communication protocol, etc.). Only
the SN has to be adapted with the same communication
protocol used in the distributed system, to sniff the messages.
B. PLATFORM COMPONENTS DESIGN
Figure 4 shows the structure and operation of the MN.
The Monitor is based on both hardware and software ele-
ments, following a hybrid approach that, as will be demon-
strated later, is essential to achieve low intrusion in the WSN
operation.
FIGURE 4. Structure and composition of the Monitor Node.
The software component is located in theMonitoring layer.
The aforementioned software traps capture and send informa-
tion about the events to be recorded, as defined by the user.
A trap is activated when its corresponding event is detected
in the observed sensor node. Then, it sends a specific event
code through a physical interface of the sensor node. This is
called a software probe.
The hardware component of the MN mainly covers the
information level. It consists of the attached node that
receives the information sent from the sensor node and pro-
cesses it. The Mon-Inf interface can be implemented using
any transmission equipment available in the sensor node,
preferably a standard interface (serial or parallel).
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The Interchange layer can provide two different services.
Data may be stored on a non-volatile memory – for example
a Secure Digital (SD) memory–, or may be sent through
a communication interface (preferably through a secondary
monitoring network to avoid overload on the application
network) to the Monitor Server. Both methods may be used
simultaneously if required by the application.
The Information layer must register the timing of the cap-
tured events. Thus, the MN uses a Real Time Clock (RTC)
for the generation of timestamps.
Following the aforementioned architecture, Figure 5 shows
the components of the Sniffer Node. The Monitoring level is
implemented by means of a hardware probe, which consists
of a wireless transducer compatible with theWSN. It operates
in promiscuous mode, with the same configuration as the
monitored network (frequency, channels, signal modulation,
etc.). The packets received through this probe are converted
into events that are processed by the Information layer and
the Interchange layer, as described in the MN.
FIGURE 5. Structure and composition of the Sniffer Node.
Finally, the Monitor Server must collect all the traces
generated for each element of the platform, process them and
generate a single trace that reflects all the gathered infor-
mation. This process involves the resynchronization of the
traces that have been generated by the other elements of the
HMP, and the unification of the same ones. As discussed
later, the traces merging process needs a resynchronization
mechanism to avoid errors in the global trace (change of order
of events due to inaccuracies of the nodes clocks).
Optionally, the MS may display the results. The elements
of the MS are shown in Figure 6.
C. PLATFORM SYNCHRONIZATION
HMP integrates a new trace synchronization mechanism
called GTSO (Global Trace Synchronization and Order-
ing Mechanism). Its objective is the synchronization of the
individual traces obtained by each one of the HMP ele-
ments, avoiding the drawbacks of the mechanisms cited in
section 2.B.
In [45], the authors performed a study of problems
and alternatives for distributed monitoring platforms, and
finally proposed a new trace synchronization mechanism
FIGURE 6. Structure and composition of the Monitor Server.
called GTSO. This mechanism is a simple offline mechanism
based on the inclusion of common synchronization points in
the traces generated by the components of the platform.
GTSO requires a Synchronization Server called SyncRoot.
The function of the SyncRoot is to provide synchronism
between the elements of the HMP, to achieve coherence in
the sequence of events in the generated traces. The Sync-
Root generates periodic events, which are received by each
element of the platform and added as synchronization points
in their trace. The SyncRoot also stores the timing of these
synchronization events. The traces will be corrected (syn-
chronized) based on these synchronization points. Although
the SyncRoot can be implemented as a standalone element,
in our demonstrator it has been integrated into the MS. The
Figure 7 shows the operation of the mechanism.
FIGURE 7. Schematic of global trace synchronization method.
The SyncRoot transmits periodically a synchronization
point (step 1). The HMP element (monitor or sniffer node)
inserts in its trace an event which includes the local arrival
time of this point (step 2).
Using these synchronization points, the timestamp of
events can be corrected (step 3). The local clock (and so the
generated timestamps) can be delayed (as in Figure 7) or
advanced compared with the reference time in SyncRoot.
This synchronization is performed by means of the fol-
lowing procedure: Let us tEvm denote the timestamp of an
event m, that has been recorded in a HMP node between two
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consecutive local synchronization points with timestamps
tln−1 and tln, that is it, tln−1 ≤ tEvm ≤ tln, with tln−1 < tln. The
corrected timestamp of the eventm, denoted as tCEvm, may be
calculated with the formula (1), where tCn−1 is the timestamp
in SyncRoot of the synchronization point recorded in tln−1,
and T is the transmission period of synchronization points.
tCEvm = tCn−1 + tEvm − tln−1tln − tln−1 T (1)
As the drift rate may be unstable over time [40], the trans-
mission period (T ) for the synchronization points must be
adjusted to the characteristics of the local clocks.
A wrong value of T may produce timing errors, such as
an inversion (change) in the correct order of observed events,
when these have been captured from different sources in a
distributed platform, as the authors have tested previously
in [40]. Therefore, T can be increased when the HMP nodes
are provided with a high quality local clock, minimizing
the overhead of this process, as far as the correct order-
ing is granted. On the other hand, when using low quality
clock sources, T must be decreased to achieve the required
accuracy.
D. IMPLEMENTATION OF PLATFORM COMPONENTS
1) IMPLEMENTATION OF MN
As stated above, a sensor node of the observed WSN is
monitored by a small piece of code inserted in the sensor node
(software part) and a Monitoring Node (MN) that receives
the information transmitted by this code (hardware part).
The code added to the monitored node performs two main
functions: i) the initialization of the interface to communicate
with the MN and ii) the software traps that capture the events
(probe). A library that contains both functions and a header
file with the necessary definitions and prototypes is included
in the software of the sensor node. Source files required to be
compiled in the monitored WSN node, are also included.
Algorithm 1 shows an example of the probe implementa-
tion added to the sensor node. A function –namedWriteLog–
sends the information byte by byte to the MN through the
selected hardware interface (Mon-Inf interface). As can be
seen in the main function of Algorithm 1, a call to the
WriteLog function is added for each event to be captured. The
information sent for each call includes the appropriate event
code and the additional data related to the event of interest.
In the example shown in Algorithm 1, the registered events
are the start of the sensor node execution and the transmission
of a wireless message.
Each event requires a single invocation of the trap routine.
An interrupt routine manages the transmission of the different
bytes that identify the event and its parameters.
Regarding the implementation of the Mon-Inf interface,
this MN may use either a parallel interface, through GPIO
(General Purpose Input/Output) pins, or a serial interface,
such as UART (Universal Asynchronous Receiver / Trans-
mitter) or SPI bus. In [44] it has been evaluated the high
Algorithm 1Monitoring Code in the Sensor Node
WriteLog( DataLong, code, msg[] )
if DataLong >0) then
msgTx = 0× 80 + code
Serial_send (msgTx)
Serial_send (DataLong)






main (void) /∗Sensor Node main application∗/
. . .





influence of the chosen communication interface in the intru-
sion caused.
When the MN receives an event data from the probe,
the Information Level applies a pre-established format to the
stored information. Each monitoring campaign may choose
and define the more suitable storage format, and provide it to
the Information Layer in the MN by means of a template file
stored in the SD memory. When this file exists in the SD,
the template is loaded and applied to each event. In other
case, a generic format is applied. This format must include
a Timestamp generated by the MN.
Then, the Interchange Level receives each event and its
related data. This information must be delivered to the mon-
itor server (MS), even being transferred (through a moni-
toring communication network) and/or stored (i.e. in a SD
memory) for later manual handling. In our demonstrator,
an XML (Extensible Markup Language) type structure has
been defined and Ethernet has been used as monitoring net-
work. However, any other wired or wireless communication
interfaces would also be applicable.
To verify the right operation of the HMP, a prototype
of NM was developed and incorporated into the definitive
platform (Figure 8). It is based on an STM32F407 micro-
controller –ARM Cortex M4– incorporated in the evaluation
board STM32F4Discovery [46], alongside with an expansion
board STM32F4DisBB [47]. This expansion board incorpo-
rates a micro-SD memory storage and many communications
features, such as Ethernet Interface.
2) IMPLEMENTATION OF SN
The Sniffer Node was based on the same hardware that the
NM prototype, plus a hardware probe. This probe is imple-
mented by means of a wireless interface similar to the sensor
nodes in observed WSN, working in promiscuous mode.
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FIGURE 8. The MN incorporated into the platform.
As in the MN, the Interchange level of this SN has been
implemented using both communication and storage options.
3) IMPLEMENTATION OF MS
The Monitor Server may be implemented in any computer
that supports the developed applications (currently running
under Linux OS). The main functions of the MS are focused
on the Monitoring layer, especially in the processing of the
obtained traces, such as storage, synchronization and unifica-
tion of the traces, automatic analysis of the obtained unified
trace and visualization of the results (in both graphic and
textual modes).
Beyond this specific application, developed for this pur-
pose, other existing applications or systems could also be
used –e.g. Wireshark [48], NAM for NS2 [49], or NetAnim
for NS3 [50]–. Just a suitable plug-in must be provided to
transcribe into native files the XML structures defined for the
generated information.
The GUI –located in the Monitoring level in the Server–
allows the control of the main MS options of the moni-
toring platform. This interface, like the data’s processing
procedures explained above, was implemented in Python pro-
gramming language in an Ubuntu GNU/Linux environment.
Both the synchronism messages and trace reception were
performed by applications created in the C language using
the GCC compiler. They are invoked from the MS main
application.
Figure 9 shows the main window of the MS application,
with themonitoring settings, and Figure 10 shows an example
of the output with the unified trace.
IV. EVALUATION OF THE PLATFORM
Intrusion is the most important feature of monitoring tools,
as far as it affects the performance of the observed system,
and therefore modify the obtained measures. This section
evaluates the intrusion generated by the monitoring opera-
tion of HMP in the observed WSN. First of all, the WSN
under monitoring and how HMP is applied to this system is
described. In second place, its operation and some results are
shown. From these results, the intrusion generated by HMP
is studied.
FIGURE 9. Main window of the graphic interface of the MS.
FIGURE 10. Unified trace processed by the platform.
A. MONITORED WSN
A habitat monitoring WSN application has been used to
evaluate HMP. In this application, WSN nodes periodi-
cally measure the ambient temperature and transmit it to
a sink node. The wireless sensor nodes are based on the
CC1110F32 microcontroller from Texas Instruments, a low
power sub-1Ghz system-on-chip designed for low power
wireless applications [51]. WSN designers decided to use the
SimpliciTI RF Protocol. This protocol is provided by Texas
Instruments as on open library [52] and was designed to pro-
vide an easy implementation and deployment out-of-the-box
on several Texas Instruments RF platforms [51]. SimpliciTI
defines three types of nodes: End device (ED), Repeater or
range extender (RE), andAccess point or Collector (AP). The
nodes implemented as ED are provided with a temperature
sensor. Other nodes adopt the role of RE, and forward the
measurements to a sink node, configured as an AP.
This way, the application consists of sensor nodes (ED)
that periodically (every 10 seconds) wake up from low power
mode, measures the ambient temperature, reading its value
from a sensor and transmits it towards a collector node (AP).
After that, returns to low power mode. To reach the collector,
another repeater node (RE) must forward the frame. This RE
also acts as a sensor node (ED), but it does not switch to low
powermode, because it has to provide the forwarding services
continuously. The forwarding operation is transparent to the
ED device, which is not aware of this reemission required
to access the collector. The described scheme is shown in
Figure 11.
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FIGURE 11. Communication scheme of the monitored WSN.
The MNs were easily connected to the observed WSN
nodes by means of a standard interface as commented in
next section, and the monitoring code was introduced into the
SimpliciTI library in the sensor nodes; so, a slight software
modification of the observed nodes is necessary. The three
types of nodes involved – sensor node (ED), repeater (RE)
and collector (AP) – have been monitored with the aforemen-
tioned MN.
The events observed in each one of these nodes depend on
its role. In the sensor nodes (ED), four events were considered
significant: data transmission ( Transmission), data recep-
tion ( Reception), transmission error ( Log_Error) and wake
up ( WakeUp). The RE node remained active continuously,
so Wakeup events were not considered; only the events of
data transmission, transmission error and data reception were
registered. Finally, the collector node (AP) only considered
the events of reception and start of operation ( Reset).
Moreover, to sniff wireless messages, several SN nodes
were added. In this case, the SN has been adapted in order
to include the appropriate probe: a Texas Instrument Sub-Ghz
RF module with SimpliciTI routines working in promiscuous
mode to capture all messages. These messages are passed to
themain controller of the SN in order to fulfill the Interchange
level tasks. Finally, events from SN nodes are identified in the
trace by the Captured_Message event.
In order to obtain reliable results, experiments showed in
next sections were repeated n times until an estimation of µ
(that is, the value of the measured parameter) was obtained
with a 95% of confidence interval, according to Student’s
t-distribution with n − 1 degrees of freedom.
The next figures enlighten the analysis of application of
HMP to observe the operation of the previously described
WSN for diagnostic purposes.
Figure 12 and Figure 13 show parts of the unified trace
registered by the platform. In Figure 12, a message was sent
from the ED (node C207), and it was retransmitted by the
ED/RE (node C206) to the sink or AP (node C201). In the
highlighted lines, the transmission of the ED, the reception
and retransmission by the ED/RE, as well as the captures
in the SN (node S101) for both transmissions are observed.
The first hop is marked in yellow. The second hop, in pink.
In this second hop, it can be noticed that the reception in
the sink is not observed (the next C206 node transmission
two seconds later corresponds to another message). From this
trace it may be deduced that the problem must be related to
the reception in the sink, as it can be assured that the message
was sent by the ED/RE.
An active monitoring platform would detect the transmis-
sion command in ED/RE node and lack of reception in the
AP node; but it cannot be ensured that the message was
really sent to the air. The source of the problem could be
both the transmission in ED/RE and the reception in AP.
On the other hand, a passive monitoring platform, such as
a distributed sniffer platform, would detect the message in
the air, but it could not ensure if AP received it. The hybrid
monitoring allows pinpointing the source of the problemwith
more accuracy.
HMP may be also useful to detect some programming
errors. Figure 13 shows an example where a possible prob-
lem in the WSN nodes is detected. The application stab-
lishes that each node must transmit the measured temperature
each 10 seconds. However, the operation cycles of both the
repeater node and the sensor node were slightly different
from the 10 seconds. In Figure 13, Transmission events in
the sensor node ED (node C207) and in the repeater node
ED/RE (node C206) have been highlighted. It can be noticed
that the cycle in the ED/RE node (pink lines) was shorter
than the cycle in the ED (yellow lines). This phenomenon
could produce unwanted effects depending on the application
requirements.
Many causes could be responsible of this behavior. May be
that difference in the clock speed of the nodes has not been
taken into account [40], or simply denotes nonexistence –or
malfunction– of a synchronization mechanism in the WSN.
Other causes could be programming errors or hardware
defects.
These delays could have consequences. For example, they
could disserve the use of low consumption modes in the
WSN between sampling periods. The detection of these prob-
lems justifies taking measures to ensure the synchronization
among the WSN. The HMP platform, therefore, may be
useful to detect also this kind of anomalies.
Finally, the HMP is able to record both internal events and
communication events that happen in the nodes of a WSN.
Thus, the traces generated by the platform alsomay be used to
reproduce the operation of the WSN in a simulator. Besides,
othersmechanisms for diagnosis, as for example the proposed
in [57] (a belief rule base model for fault diagnosis of WSN)
or [58] (a directional diagnosis approach for determining
WSN faults), could be used combined with HMP, based on
the obtained traces.
These are only a few examples of the usefulness of the
HMP to monitor and evaluate the operation of a WSN.
B. INTRUSION EVALUATION OF THE MONITOR NODE
The intrusion –also called interference or overload– is
the variation caused by the monitoring functions on the
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FIGURE 12. A sample of message lost in the AP node.
FIGURE 13. A sample of cycle time differences.
performance of the monitored system [9]. In HMP, the soft-
ware added to sensor nodesmay be considered themain cause
of intrusion. Three parameters of performance are affected
by this code: used memory, duty cycle (working time), and
energy consumption. Energy intrusion has proven [44] to be
directly related to the working time and the characteristics
of the observed node. Therefore, this parameter has not been
directly studied in this evaluation.
1) TIME INTRUSION
The addition of program lines in a sensor node also affects
its performance, insofar as it implies that the sensor node
has to execute new instructions. Usually, the sensor nodes in
WSN remain in the low-power state most of the time, and
only switch to active mode for short time intervals to perform
their functions, and then return to low-power state. Therefore,
this active time is increased due the addition of trap routines.
To evaluate the intrusion in working time, this incre-
ment of execution time has been measured experimentally.
The application running on an ED was modified to include
the activation and deactivation of a digital output line at the
beginning and the end of the execution of the trap function.
The pulse width of this signal was measured with a digital
Keysight oscilloscope, model DSO6014A. According to its
specifications, their time measurements must assume an error
of ± 0.005% in the reading plus ± 0.1% of the width of the
oscilloscope screen [53].
It was found in previous experiments [44] that the trap
execution time depends on the amount of data that the MN
must register for this event. The designer of the monitoring
campaign decides the number of bytes to be registered in
each event in order to study the system behavior. This size
may vary from just one byte to identify an event without
additional information, to many bytes to record the values
of some variables for later analysis, and even the complete
content of a WSN message.
Keeping this inmind, three cases were considered: a simple
trap that only sends one byte (1-byte code to identify the
captured event), an extended trap with 2 bytes (event code +
additional byte) and finally a trap with 4 bytes of param-
eters (trap code and three additional bytes). It was found
that, as expected, the results depend on the implementation
of the Mon-Inf interface, as time intrusion is related with
the transmission time of data from sensor node to the NM.
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TABLE 1. Intrusion in time in the monitored node (in microseconds).
Three different available interfaces of the microcontrollers
(GPIO, SPI and UART) have been considered.
Table 1 shows the results obtained. As shown, parallel
transmission using GPIO obtains the worst results. This is
caused by the lack of specific hardware for flow control over
parallel transmission through digital I/O ports. Therefore,
the implementation of an acknowledgment protocol ( hand-
shake) in the monitoring library was required to avoid control
flow errors. On the other hand, when using standard serial
interfaces –such as SPI or UART– the transmission time does
not increase significantly with the number of bytes transmit-
ted, probably due to the availability of dedicated devices for
data transmission that use direct memory access (DMA) in
parallel with the main processor of the sensor node. These
devices also take care of flow control, so no additional man-
agement is required.
The impact of monitoring operation in the working times
of the observed sensor node has been estimated, increasing
its awaking time.
Based on the results of Table 1, and considering eight
registered events with 8 bytes of data each one (the trap code,
a data length byte and six of additional data), the intrusionwas
calculated. Sensor nodeworking times from 10 to 70millisec-
onds were considered, according with many common WSN
applications. For instance, [54] presents a wireless node to
measure performance on a track bike, with a node working
time of 30ms. Other cases such as that presented in [55] –
monitoring charge of environmental cooling and heating– or
in [56] –a wireless sensor node activated by wireless power–,
the time in which the node is active can reach 100ms.
FIGURE 14. Intrusion estimation in working time.
Figure 14 shows the results of the time intrusion. For the
worst case –10ms of working time, using parallel commu-
nication with GPIO– the intrusion barely exceeds 1%. When
the working time is greater than 30ms, it does not reach 0.4%.
On the other hand, using a serial interface and DMA it does
not exceed 0.3% in the analyzed cases.
2) CODE INTRUSION
The addition of program lines in a sensor node usually
increases the required memory usage. The code intrusion has
been evaluated by comparing the size in bytes of the compiled
code before and after the addition of themonitoring functions.
As expected, the increase in size depends on the number of
recorded events, that is, the number of traps added into the
original code.
Table 2 shows the values of the intrusion in the nodes with
the SimpliciTI protocol registering four (ED), three (RE) and
two (AP) events. The evaluation was made using the SPI lines
as Mon-Inf interface. An deeper study about the influence
of Mon-Inf interface implementation in the intrusion can be
found in [44]. That study was performed with a previous
version of the MN.
TABLE 2. Increment of code and memory using caused by MN (in bytes).
The code memory required for monitoring purposes is
less than 1KB. Notice that the code increment in the Access
point is smaller than in the other two. It was found that
original Access Point implementation already included some
SimpliciTI routines that were not used in Sensor and Repeater
implementation, but are required for monitoring interface.
On the other hand, the increase in data memory using –shown
in the xdata column– is constant for all cases (memory space
for monitor routines variables), and it does not reach 5% in
relation to the space required by the original application of
the node.
V. COMPARISON WITH OTHER PROPOSALS
There are a very few proposals found in the bibliography that
may be compared with HMP. Table 3 shows a comparison of
the characteristics of several platforms, mentioned above.
In some cases, there is not information available about
the intrusion caused by the monitoring platform over the
observed WSN. In others, it is not clear if the tool can
be applied to other nodes different from the used by their
authors. For instance, many implementations are based on
TinyOS options, being very difficult its portability to other
environments. Anyway, for the platforms which provide this
information, it can be seen that the declared intrusion is not
negligible.
Table 4 shows a comparison of features and capabili-
ties between active monitors, passive monitors, and HMP.
The very low intrusion caused by HMP is one of its best
advantages when compared with other monitoring platforms.
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TABLE 3. Comparison of WSN monitoring platforms.
TABLE 4. Capabilities of active platforms, passive platforms, and HMP.
The solution applied in HMP for active monitoring is also a
hybrid approach.
On one hand, active software monitoring approaches usu-
ally require the observed node to process and store the events,
thus hugely increasing the memory intrusion. In HMP this
effect is avoided by the temporal addition of an external
node (MN) which is dedicated to these functions.
A very few tools study its time interference, that’s it, they
are not aware of the influence of measurement process in
the performance of the observed WSN. However, for those
that analyze it, the intrusion tends to be higher than the
exposed in Table 2 and Figure 14 for HMP. Only NodeMD
is comparable in time intrusion with HMP. By reducing the
intrusion in code, memory and time, the lower disturbance
caused by monitoring in the WSN provides more accurate
monitoring results.
It also must be noticed that some of these tools use
the WSN to report the captured information. For instance,
Sympathy may increase WSN traffic in 31% and PAD in 8%.
Others, such as SNMS and Memento, also use WSN mes-
sages for their purposes. HMP does not modify nor uses the
WSN frames, causing no intrusion for this motive.
Attending its characteristics, there are a very few proposals
found in the bibliography that may be compared with HMP.
The closer ones, as hybrid platforms, could be the aforemen-
tioned Spi-snooper [36] and HFD [11].
Spi-Snooper passively monitors the communication
between the microcontroller and the external radio processor,
which are connected by a SPI bus. This is suitable for a very
few architectures, being unusable when other interfaces are
used, or both elements are in the same chip. Moreover, only
communication-related events may be observed, keeping the
internal state of the processor unobservable.
HDF is also a hybrid monitoring environment, where the
monitor nodes may query the observed node about its state.
Passive observation is also possible. The authors have not
developed the whole platform, and only a single component –
the active one – has been designed as a prototype. This
design is highly hardware-dependent and the overload of this
monitoring has not been evaluated, but it may be supposed
that the intrusion caused by queries is not negligible.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a Hybrid Monitoring Platform (HMP) for WSN
has been presented. HMP is designed to be used to aid in
development, debugging and deployment of WSN in both
laboratory and on-the-field WSN applications.
HMP is based on an open architecture, which provides
both interoperability and flexibility in the development of its
components. Moreover, the use of a standard format to store
the collected information allows other applications to use this
information.
The hybrid approach combines both passive and active
operation to provide greater observability of the monitored
WSN with low intrusion. The active part, also, uses a hybrid
hardware/software approach to reduce intrusion. Software
traps offer high flexibility for the designer to define the
most suitable monitoring campaign, and the MN provides
additional hardware to process the events without increasing
the workload of the observed sensor node.
From the point of view of distributedmonitoring, two of the
HMP proposed elements are remarkably new. The first is the
Monitoring Node (MN), a hybrid hardware-software compo-
nent. TheMN implements the three layers of the architecture:
Monitoring layer covers the reception of events from the sen-
sor node; Information layer provides a mechanism of format
assignment and time stamp; Interchange layer performs the
data storage. This frees the monitored node from these tasks
and therefore achieves a very low intrusion to the observed
sensor node. On the other hand, the mechanism of trace
synchronization is also a novelty. It provides a simple but
effective procedure, susceptible to be applied in many other
monitoring systems that require offline trace synchronization.
When comparing with other studied proposals, the intru-
sion caused by the MN is lower than other active approaches,
that usually introduce intrusion, but provides very valuable
information regarding the operation of the node. In addition,
the MN has proven to be suitable for most of the sensor node
implementations, as it can use many standard interfaces. The
MNs may be reused in many new monitoring campaigns.
HMP gathers information from both internal events of the
sensor nodes and their wireless transmissions. Combining
both sources of information allows a more complete analysis
of the behavior of the monitored WSN. In addition, the final
trace reproduces the true operation of the WSN, so it may be
used as synthetic workload for many simulation tools. This
opens many new possibilities for these tools, such as the eval-
uation of the performance of a new WSN implementation.
The applicability of HMP on real WSN nodes has been
evaluated, being a success. The modular architecture allows
a highly configurable monitoring, and the functions imple-
mented in the MS provide an agile processing of the obtained
data. The benefits achieved by the platform have been demon-
strated by means of the detection of two anomalies in the
operation of the nodes.
Scalability is one of the best characteristics of HMP.
Increasing the number of observed nodes in a WSN would
not harm the performance of the monitoring system, as each
MN is independent of the rest. Even more, real-time reports –
which are not required for WSN monitoring – may be
achieved if the monitoring communication network is prop-
erly sized.
As a future work, the HMP capabilities will be improved
by the evolution of MN and SN. A wireless GTSO syn-
chronization mechanism based on a secondary radio channel
for synchronization signals is being verified. In this new
approach, the Interchange layer is implemented by a SD card,
and all the HMP elements are provided with an autonomous
power source, avoiding any wire requirement. In this new
implementation, the applicability of HMP in deployed net-
works will be greatly improved.
Finally, a parser is being developed for translating any trace
log to a synthetic workload for several network simulators.
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